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AXIOMATIZING THE SHAPLEY VALUE 
WITHOUT LINEARITY 
H.P. Young 
This paper shows that the Shapley value can be uniquely 
characterized by a simple monotonicity condition without re- 
sorting to either the linearity or dummy assumptions originally 
used by Shapley [ 4 1 .  
Let N be a fixed finite set. By a game in characteristic 
function form is meant a function v which assigns to every sub- 
set S of N a real number v(S), called the value of S, such that 
v(@) = 0, and for all disjoint S and T 
A v a l u e  is a function '4 : V -+ 1~~ where V is the set of all N N 
games on N. Following Shapley we say that P is syrnrnetr-ic if for 
every permutation of N we have 
where ITV is the game defined by (ITV) (S) =  ITS) for all S. The 
value P is e f f i c i e n t  if Tvi(v) = v(N) for all v. 
N 
M o n o t o n i c i t y  compares a player's inherent claims in different 
games on the same set N. One formulation of this property, due 
t o  Megiddo [ 3 1 ,  i s  t h a t  i f  two games v  and w d i f f e r  o n l y  i n  t h a t  
v(N)  - > w ( N )  , t h e n  w e  shou ld  have 'fi ( v )  - > 'fi (w)  f o r  a l l  i. I n  
o t h e r  words,  i f  i n  p a s s i n g  from w t o  v  t h e  c l a i m s  o f  a l l  p r o p e r  
c o a l i t i o n s  s t a y  t h e  same w h i l e  t h e  t o t a l  amount t o  b e  d i s t r i b u t e d  
i n c r e a s e s ,  t h e n  no p l a y e r ' s  a l l o c a t i o n  s h o u l d  d e c r e a s e .  The 
ana logous  concep t  a l s o  a r i s e s  i n  appor t ionment  [ I ]  and b a r -  
g a i n i n g  t h e o r y  [ 2 ] .  Megiddo shows by example t h a t  t h e  n u c l e o l u s  
i s  n o t  monotonic i n  t h i s  s e n s e .  
The f o l l o w i n g  s t r o n g e r  f o r m u l a t i o n  a l l o w s  a  comparison of  
p l a y e r s '  a l l o c a t i o n s  under  more g e n e r a l  changes  i n  t h e  s t r u c -  
t u r e  o f  t h e  game. F o r  any game v  and p l a y e r  i ' t h e  d e r i v a t i v e  o f  
v  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  i i s  t h e  f u n c t i o n  v i ( S )  d e f i n e d  f o r  a l l  S L N  
such t h a t  
i i The v a l u e  'f i s  s t r o n g l y  m o n o t o n i c  i f  whenever v  (S)  2 w (s)  
f o r  a l l  S  t h e n  Vi(v) 2 Pi ( w )  . I n  o t h e r  words, i f  i n  p a s s i n g  from 
w t o  v ,  i t s  m a r g i n a l  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  e v e r y  s u b s e t  i n c r e a s e s  o r  
s t a y s  t h e  same, t h e n  i ' s  a l l o c a t i o n  must n o t  d e c r e a s e .  I n  p a r t i c -  
u l a r  s t r o n g  rnonotonic i ty  i m p l i e s  m o n o t o n i c i t y  i n  ~ e g i d d o  ' s s e n s e .  
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  t h e  Shap ley  v a l u e  i s  s t r o n g l y  monotonic,  
s i n c e  it may b e  w r i t t e n  
Theorem.  The S h a p l e y  v a l u e  5 s  t h e  u n i q u e  s y m m e t r i c  and 
e f f i c i e n t  v a l u e  t h a t  i s  s t r o n g l y  m o n o t o n i c .  
P r o o f .  F i r s t  n o t e  t h a t  s t r o n g  m o n o t o n i c i t y  means t h a t  f o r  
any two games v ,  wEVN, 
Next consider the symmetric game w on N which is identically 
i 
zero on all coalitions, so that w (S) = 0 for all iIS. BY SYm- 
metry 'fi(w) = 'fj (w) for all i # j and by efficiency l'fi(w) = 0 , 
N hence for all i, 'fi(w) = 0. By (1) it follows that for any game 
v on N and any i E N ,  
( 2 )  i v (S) = 0 YS implies Pi(v) = 0 . 
That is, dummy players get nothing. 
We now exploit the fact noted by Shapley that every game v 
can be expressed as a sum of p r i m i t i v e  games 
where 
The Shapley value can be expressed Pi(v) = I yi(cRvR) = I c ~ / ( R ~ .  
~#R=N R: i€R r .  - 
A game u is sgnmetric if for all i#j there is a rermutation.~taking 
i to j such that u(nS) = u(S) for all S. Letting cr = max c 
R: 1 R I  =r R 
- 
- 
- c  a n d u =  1 C I ~ I V ~ ,  v c a n b e  for 1 < r < n, cR = ClR1 
RI @#LY. 
rewritten in the form 
where cR 2 0 YR and u is symmetric. Define the i n d e x  I of v to 
be the minimum number of terms with E R  > 0 in some expression 
for v of form (4). The theorem is proved by induction on I. 
If I = 0, v = u is symmetric so 'Qi(v) = V.(V) for all i # j, 
I 
whence by efficiency 'fi(v) = v(~)/n, which is the Shapley value. 
i If I = 1, v =  u - 2 v for some R ~ N .  For i g R ,  v (S) = R R 
ui(s) for all S, hence by monotonicity Pi (v) = u (N) /n. By sym- 
metry Pi (v) = P .  (v) for all i, j E R; combined with efficiency 3 
this says that 
u ( N ) / n - e R / I R I  f o r i E R  
u ( N )  /n f o r  i @ R  
which i s  t h e  Shapley va lue  f o r  v .  
Assume now t h a t  v ( v )  i s  t h e  Shapley va lue  whenever t h e  index 
of  v  i s  a t  most I. I n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h i s  means t h a t  i f  v  = u - 
l a  v then  
k=l Rk Rk 
Let  v  have index 1+1 wi th  express ion  
1+1 
Le t  R = n Rk and suppose i e R .  Define t h e  game 
k= 1 
and no te  t h a t  w i s  s u p e r a d d i t i v e .  The index of w i s  a t  most I 
and w i ( s )  = v i ( s )  f o r  a l l  S f  s o  us ing  induc t ion  it fo l lows  t h a t  
t h e  l a t t e r  s i n c e  Pi (CR vR ) = 0 whenever i 4 R  by ( 2 ) .  But t h i s  
k k  k '  
i s  j u s t  t h e  Shapley va lue  f o r  i. 
I t  remains t o  show t h a t  Vi(v) i s  t h e  Shap ley .va lue  when 
1+1 1+1 - 
i E R = n ~ i ,  i . e . ,  t h a t  vi ( v )  = p i  (u )  - 1 s . Since  v  i s  
k= 1 k=l Rk 1+1 
symmetric on R it s u f f i c e s  t o  show t h a t  1 ( ' f i  ( u )  - lpi (v)  ) = I RI 1 S . 
R k=l Rk 
This  fo l lows  by observing t h a t  
1 (pi(u) - (Pi(v)) = ,I ,I yi(eRkvRk 1 
N-R k=l i€N-R 
the latter since R C R ~  for all k. 
Thus by efficiency 
Observe that the proof only requires the assumption that a 
player's value depends just on the vector of his marginal contri- 
butions. This condition is also implicit in Shapley's axiom 
i i 
scheme, which requires that dummies get nothing: if v ( S )  = w (S) 
for all S then i is a dummy in (v-w) so 'fi(v-w) = 0: combined with 
linearity it follows that 'Pi(v) = Vi(w). On the other hand, the 
i 
condition that vi (S) = w ( S )  implies 'Pi (v) = Pi(u) is much weaker 
than the dummy and linearity axioms, indeed seems only slightly 
stronger than the dummy axiom itself. What we have shown is that 
by taking full advantage of efficiency and symmetry we can use 
it to deduce linearity and effectively characterize the Shapley 
value. 
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